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UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND THE TELOSOF HUMAN DIGNITY
William Joseph Wagner'
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,' along with the United Nations covenants on economic, social
and cultural rights, and civil and political rights of 1966,2 are instances
of the age-old aspiration to harness power to advance genuine human
fulfillment under a rule of reason. All were adopted based on the
premise that the world will be united. The United Nations adoption
reflects the belief that this manifest destiny of the human race should
proceed, if possible, on the plane of universal respect for human
dignity, rather than by force. This choice of options was the lesson of
the conflagration of World War H1.3
The device of promulgating universal rights guarantees represents
an alternative to an older approach that sought to bring about legal
observance of general norms of reasonableness governing conduct,
that were formulated in terms of moral duty and grounded in fidelity
iF Professor of Law and Director, Law, Philosophy & Culture Initiative, Columbus School
of Law, The Catholic University of America. B.A. UCLA, 1975; J.D., Yale University, 1978; Ph.D.,
The Catholic University of America, 2002.
1. Universal Declaration of Human 'ghts, G.A. Res. 217A(II), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS (Vol. I, Part 1) 1 (1994) [hereinafter
COMPILATION]. The preamble to the Declaration declares that it is adopted as a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." Id. at 2. The Declaration was adopted
with unanimous approval by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 (with
abstentions by the Soviet Union, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and five other nations). Avery
Dulles, Human Rights: Papal Teaching and the United Nations, AMERICA, Dec. 5,1998, at 14, 14.
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAUR, 21st Sess., 1496th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
COMPILATION, supra note 1, at 8; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
COMPILATION, supra note 1, at 20.
3. Mary Ann Glendon notes, "The horrors of two world wars" led some to believe "that
some principles of human decency are so basic that every nation and culture could accept them
as a common yardstick." Mary Ann Glendon, John P Humphrey and the Drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human RMghts, 2 J. HIST. INT'L L. 250, 250 (2000).
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to traditions of right behavior.4 The Catholic Church long was a
stalwart proponent of the older approach and spent considerable
energy in a rearguard defense against early incursions of the newer
model throughout much of the nineteenth century.' But following
World War II, the Church clearly and unambiguously converted to
the newer rights approach.' In Pacem in Terris, John XXIII described
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an "act
of the highest importance."7  In Redemptor Hominis, John Paul II
4. David Hollenbach describes the transition which Pope John XXIII makes in Pacem in
Terris from the older to the newer approach by its
careful discussion of the correspondence between rights and duties. To the moral
claims which arise from human dignity there correspond duties and responsibilities of
society. To every human right there corresponds the duty that this right be respected
by the subject of the right himself or herself, by other individual persons and by
society.
... The rights it affirms have been assembled from those mentioned and defended
in the previous documents of the tradition.
DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: RETRIEVING AND RENEWING THE CATHOLIC
HUMAN RIGHTS TRADITION 65-66 (1979). Hollenbach observes that by its shift in emphasis and
direction, the encyclical is able significantly to enlarge "the domain of rights" and "includes
both those rights stressed by the liberal democratic tradition and those emphasized by
socialists." Id. at 66. John Finnis analyzes the shift from the older to the newer approach by
tracing the changing meaning of jus or "right" within the theories of western political writers.
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 205-10 (1980).
5. "If one moves back 100 years before Pacem in Ten-is in the history of papal teaching on
society, one comes to the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX (1864).... Pius IX was struggling to
preserve a privileged or even a monopoly position for the Catholic religion.... Catholicism's
institutional sympathies during most of the nineteenth century were with conservatism that had
its roots in the ancien regime." John Langan, Human Rights in Roman Catholicism, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 25, 31-32 (Arlene Swidler ed., 1982).
6. "The Roman Catholic Church has stepped boldly in the aftermath of the Second
Vatican Council (1962-1965) to develop a refined human rights theology and advocacy." John
Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996). Mary
Ann Glendon recounts that the Catholic theologian Jacques Maritain was one of a group of
philosophers asked by UNESCO to examine the question as a step in drafting the Declaration
and she states that significant portions of the Declaration are traceable to the social encyclicals of
the Catholic Church. Mary Ann Glendon, The Sources of 'Rights Talk', Some Are Catholic,
COMMONWEAL, Oct. 12, 2001, at 11, 11. And apparently even the Catholic Bishops of the United
States had an influence in the drafting process: "A committee of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference-the forerunner of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops-issued a statement
on human rights in 1947.... [A] copy of that statement reached Eleanor Roosevelt, and.., many
passages in the 1948 U.N. declaration [drafted by the U.N. committee Roosevelt headed] are
strikingly similar to the U.S. bishops' document, suggesting probable influence." John L. Allen,
Jr., Church's Human Rights Record a Mixed Bag, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 11, 1998, at 13, 13.
7. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris [Encyclical Letter on Establishing Universal Peace in
Truth, Justice, Charity and Libert] 143 (St. Paul ed. 1963) [hereinafter Pacem in Terris]. David
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called it a cause of "joy of all people of good will," and, in Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis, he acknowledged that a growing consciousness of human
dignity was attributable to it.8 In his October 5, 1995 address to the
United Nations, John Paul II evaluated the United Nations
Declaration as a "basic inspiration and cornerstone" of human
conscience.9
Even today, not all adherents of religion agree with the Catholic
Church on the wisdom of adopting the rights model. Polarization in
global politics indicates, for example, that some adherents of Islam do
not."° Experience under the Declaration, to this point, is mixed, even
from the perspective of Catholicism. If the goal of the Catholic
endorsement of human rights is the vindication of the telos of human
dignity, as it is conceived within the Catholic tradition, the verdict is
not in." The United Nations rights framework is not a foolproof
guarantee of authentic human fulfillment, as the Christian tradition
envisions it. In fact, events have established that the framework can
Hollenbach correctly identifies Pacem in Terris as "the most powerful and thorough statement
of the Roman Catholic understanding of human rights in modem times." HOLLENBACH, supra
note 4, at 41.
8. Pope John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis [Encyclical Letter on the Redeemer of Man]
17 (St. Paul ed. 1979); Pope John Paul II, Soilicitudo Rei Socialis [Encyclical Letter on Social
Concern] 9126 (St. Paul ed. 1987) [hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis].
9. Pope John Paul II, Address to the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations in New
York (Oct. 2, 1979), in 24 THE POPE SPEAKS 297, 300 (1979). Regarding the Vatican international
human rights policy, see EDWARD J. GRATSCH, THE HOLY SEE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1945-
1995 (1997).
10. In his "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two
Holy Places," of August 1996, Osama bin Laden, for example, inveighs against Western
aggression "under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations" with its "false claims and
propaganda about 'human rights."' LAWRENCE DAVTDSON, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: AN
INTRODUCTION 177 (2003).
11. Mary Ann Glendon writes of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women
that took place in Beijing in 1994, "The significance of Beijing for human rights is mainly in the
nature of a warning." Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1996,
at 30, 35. She notes, for example, that "[als the fiftieth anniversary of the UN's 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights approaches, the Beijing conference appears to have been a testing
ground for.., the universal language of human rights by an impoverished dialect that has
already made great inroads on political discourse in the United States." Id. Doubts exist in
some quarters, more specifically, in the capacity of the United Nations to administer human
rights oversight in keeping with the original spirit of the Declaration. "If a person would visit
from the moon and would look at these bloody violators of human rights, countries like Sudan,
which excels in slaveholding in the 21st century, sitting in judgment of political democracies like
the state of Israel, the absurdity of the U.N. Human Rights Commission becomes clear to
everybody." Has the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Lost Its Course?" A Review of Its
Mission, Operations and Structure: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Intl Operations
and Human Rights, 107th Cong. 7 (2001) (quoting Tom Lantos, Member, House Comm. on Int'l
Relations).
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actually come to interfere with societal adherence to the requisites of
such fulfillment.12 The Catholic option to support the international
human rights framework of the United Nations as a means of
advancing a sustainable global vision of human dignity must be
viewed, in a certain sense, as an experiment.
In this short essay, I seek to provide a description of the way the
rights framework, by its nature, functions to unify global practice
around normative ideals. I then outline obstacles, both theoretical
and practical, to the effective functioning of this framework and the
advancement of its purpose. Next, I lay out and critique the means
that the Church, in its official teaching, proposes for overcoming these
obstacles. I conclude by sketching briefly what I understand to be a
more adequate program for addressing the impediments that exist to
the realization of the aspiration of universal respect for human
dignity that underlies the Catholic endorsement of the United Nations
Universal Declaration. The outline I offer speaks directly to the
longer-term ongoing implementation of international human rights
guarantees and indirectly to the Church's choice of its mode of
advocating human rights in the global arena.
I. CHARACTER OF THE RIGHTS MANIFESTOS AS A DEVICE FOR
UNIFYING THE PRACTICE OF STATES
A proclamation of human rights guarantees, such as the Universal
Declaration, relies upon abstract norms, set forth without reference to
longer history, culture, or local tradition and without reference to any
stipulated ontological or metaphysical ground.13 Such a proclamation
12. As Avery Dulles, S.J. observes,
Positivism is widespread in contemporary ethical thinking. Values are commonly.
treated as expressions of merely personal preferences. Individuals and nations might
be induced to enter into agreements that would be indefinitely open to revision. The
proposed International Criminal Court might coerce nations to accept specious rights
contrary to the natural law. Present controversies about the right to contraception,
gay rights, the right to choose an abortion and the right to die illustrate the problem..
By a final absurdity, immorality itself would be elevated into a right.
Dulles, supra note 1, at 18.
13. Instead, in the Declaration's preamble, the drafters cite "disregard and contempt for
human rights" as the cause of "barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,"
referring to the excesses of World War II. And, they assert that such rights have now been
proclaimed, and that a "common understanding" of them is necessary. They assert faith in
human dignity and equality, to social progress, and the importance of "the rule of law" and of
"friendly relations between nations" as reasons for promulgating the Declaration. They do not
[Vol. 3:1
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assumes that the modes of respect it requires can be assigned,
moreover, as due a person or a configuration of persons, without a
more comprehensive description of concrete circumstances.
14
Likewise, the proclamation presupposes that the assignment of the
right has meaning without provision for a judicial office to adjudicate
its violation or a specific mechanism of law for enforcing, in any case,
any remedies that any judge might order in response to that
violation.
15
The validation of a declaration of rights depends on the unique
moral appeal of the historical moment in which it emerges or of some
immediate consensus underlying its adoption, if not on outright self-
evidence. Such a declaration assumes a universal normative
authority as the measure of the rightness of state practice, regardless
of particular circumstances. As such, it relativizes the normative
meaning of the dynamic forces of history, culture, and local tradition,
so that this meaning is at most pre-moral in character. 6 Its atemporal
directly stipulate the way in which rights have an ontological or metaphysical ground.
COMPILATION, supra note 1, at 1.
14. "For human rights laws are inherently abstract ideals-universal statements of the
good life and the good society. They depend upon the visions of human communities and
institutions to give them content and coherence, to provide 'the scale of values governing the[ir]
exercise and concrete manifestation."' Witte, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting Jacques Maritain,
Introduction to UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 15-16 (1949)).
15. Cf HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 15-
16 (1980) ("A proclamation of a right is not the fulfillment of a right .... A proclamation may or
may not be an initial step toward the fulfillment of the rights listed .... [A] right has not been
fulfilled until arrangements are in fact in place for people to enjoy whatever it is to which they
have the right."). On the United Nations mechanism for responding to reports of human rights
violations and the role of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, see Mel James, The
Country Mechanisms of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 75-84 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999).
David Hollenbach, however, argues that the nonjusticiable nature of the rights declared by the
United Nations does not, as Maurice Cranston alleges, push them "out of the clear realm of the
morally compelling into the twilight world of utopian aspiration." HOLLENBACH, supra note 4,
at 32 (citing MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 68 (1973)). Hollenbach observes,
"Liberal democratic thought, with its fundamental principle of the rule of law, has naturally
focused on those human rights which can be directly translated into legislation and
constitutional principles," but that the substantive rights important to socialism and
Catholicism, by contrast, may call for alternate modes of implementation, such that "any
adequate theory and program of human rights must recognize that different rights require
different means of implementation." Id. at 33.
16. It is possible to pursue values
in two ways: the values or goods involved in a human act would be, from one
viewpoint, of the moral order (in relation to properly moral values, such as love of
God and neighbor, justice, etc.) and, from another viewpoint, of the pre-moral order,
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and extrinsic benchmarks of due legal order invite an attitude of
constant vigilance against the potential of the dynamic and particular
elements in a legal culture to devolve into unwarranted force and
domination. They give the disempowered a mandate to challenge all
particular arrangements within a given constitutional order, by
appearing to confer extra-legal standing on the many to object to the
legal status quo. 7 The principal realm in which this "standing" can
be exercised, given its extra-legal character, is political. The abstract
importance the rights manifesto gives the individual tends to
reinforce the value of individualism and the centrality of the market.18
which some term non-moral, physical or ontic (in relation to the advantages and
disadvantages accruing...).
Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor [Encyclical Letter Regarding Certain Fundamental
Questions of the Church's Moral Teaching] 75 (St. Paul ed. 1993).
17. "Ronald Dworkin has captured the tone of the rights vocabulary by calling rights
'political trumps held by individuals."' HOLLENBACH, supra note 4, at 7 (quoting RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977)). Thomas Buergenthal explains,
By universalizing and legitimating mankind's yearning for human rights and human
dignity, the Universal Declaration has also shaped the manner in which people
around the world personalize their right to have rights. Never before have so many
people in so many countries believed that they have human rights and that it is the
purpose and duty of government to respect and protect these rights. This is not to
suggest that at other times in history human beings did not wish to be treated with
dignity or to have their rights respected. Of course they did. What has changed
though is that in the past the vast majority of humankind accepted its suffering as
preordained or unavoidable; today more and more people believe that those who
cause their suffering are acting illegally.
Thomas Buergenthal, Centerpiece of the Human Rights Revolution, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 91, 93
(Barend Van Der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998).
18. The economic implications of the rights manifesto is variously evaluated.
Starting from the Marxist assumption that civil and political rights are "formal"
bourgeois freedoms that serve only the interests of the capitalists, the conspiracy
theory holds that human rights serve the same purpose in the international arena. It
sees them as instruments of domination because they are indissolubly tied to the right
to property, and because in the field of international economic relations, the human
rights movement fosters free and unrestricted trade which seriously hurts the
economies of Third World nations.
Fernando R. Tes6n, international Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869
(1985), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 379, 390-91 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001)
(footnote omitted).
In other words, if by "capitalism" is meant what the West at its best means by
capitalism-a tripartite system in which democratic politics and a vibrant moral
culture discipline and temper the free market-then that is the system the pope urges
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The declarative-rights approach serves the many as a grammar of
dissent, providing language that enables those who use it to exert
pressure on lawmakers to reallocate power. The pre-modern Thomas
Aquinas, by contrast, saw no recourse for the disaffected except
prayer, and he considered tyrants as a scourge permitted by God for
the purification of all.19
While the rights manifesto offers a certain template of a human
rights ideal, that template is of inherently limited value, since, by its
nature, it lacks reliable cues regarding the fit of its requirements with
a society's historical and cultural traditions.20 Its guarantees are not
confined by the specificity that is the earmark both of legislative or
constitutional drafting or the concreteness that is that of justiciability
and, on the latter count, they generally are not a basis for claims for
individual relief. They have the character of preemptive objection to
institutional arrangements and societal relationships that do not
reflect their priorities. Their application tends to dissolve inherited
organic forms of social organization, and to promote reliance on
present-tense formulation of prospective visions of the social good.
The challenge of the rights-based approach, and of the modernism
associated with it, is to facilitate its own characteristically politicized
environment for coordinating common societal action without,
incidentally, eroding the possibility of continuing adherence to the
very rights concepts upon which it relies.21 The great social-contract
the new democracies and the Third World to adopt, because that is the system most
likely to sustain a human freedom that is truly liberating.
George Weigel, The Virtues of Freedom: Centesimus Annus (1991), in BUILDING THE FREE
SOCIETY: DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 207, 217 (George Weigel &
Robert Royal eds., 1993).
19. See THOMAS AQUINAS, On Princely Government: To the King of Cyprus, in AQUINAS:
SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 33, 35 (A. P. d'Entrves ed., J. G. Dawson trans., 1959) ("Finally,
when there is no hope of human aid against tyranny, recourse must be made to God the King of
all, and the helper of all who call upon Him in the time of tribulation.... But for men to merit
such benefit of God they must abstain from sinning, because it is as a punishment for sin that, by
divine permission, the impious are allowed to rule....").
20. Cf HOLLENBACH, supra note 4, at 7 ("[Tlhe language of human rights .... is crisp,
blunt, almost curt. Human beings have rights. These rights are to be respected .... The clarity
of the rights vocabulary is far from being matched by our understanding of what human rights
are, how they are interrelated, how they are limited by each other, and whether they can ever be
subordinated to other social values.").
21. Some view this challenge with complacency. For instance, Richard Rorty says,
... I shall be defending the claim that nothing relevant to moral choice separates
human beings from animals except historically contingent facts of the world, cultural
facts.
Spring 20051 203
A VEMARIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 3:1
thinkers relied heavily on the distinction between form and substance
to strike something like the required balance, with rights being largely
formal guarantees of individual freedom.22 Such thinkers did not
presume to think that the individualized political environment they
sought to advance was compatible with any extensive scheme of
substantive rights. The United Nations framework goes beyond these
precursors in stipulating a comprehensive vision of substantive
fulfillment as the subject of rights.23 The Catholic endorsement of the
United Nations framework becomes more readily understandable
when one observes that it contains substantive as well as formal
guarantees, in a manner resonant with received Catholic ideas of the
. . . Cultural relativism is associated with irrationalism because it denies the
existence of morally relevant transcultural facts .... Philosophers like myself, who
think of rationality as simply the attempt at such coherence, agree . . . that
foundationalist projects are outmoded. We see our task as a matter of making our
own culture-the human rights culture-more self-conscious and more powerful,
rather than of demonstrating its superiority to other cultures by an appeal to
something transcultural.
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, ON HUMAN RIGHTS: OXFORD
AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 (Steven Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993), reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 241, 245-46. Others do not, including Mary
Ann Glendon who comments: "Rights talk in its current form has been the thin end of a wedge
that is turning American political discourse into a parody of itself and challenging the very
notion that politics can be conducted through reasoned discussion and compromise." MARY
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 171 (1991).
22. Isaiah Berlin describes the contractarian concept of freedom as the negative ideal of
liberty. He notes:
Kant came nearest to asserting the "negative ideal" of liberty when (in one of his
political treatises) he declared,
The greatest problem of the human race, to the solution of which it is compelled
by nature, is the establishment of a civil society universally administering right
according to law. It is only in a society which possesses the greatest liberty... in
order that it may co-exist with the liberty of others-that the highest purpose of
nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be attained in the case
of mankind.
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 199 n.1 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (quoting
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht (1784), 8 CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON: KANT'S GESAMMELTE SCHRIFEN 22 (Berlin, 1900-)). An avowed modem
liberal, Isaiah disagrees with Kant's assumption that freedom can be premised on a commonly
intelligible concept of rational self-fulfillment. Id. at 49, 194-95.
23. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 2, at 8-
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common good, albeit without overt reference to traditional Catholic
attention to ontology, metaphysics, and tradition. 4
II. THEORETICAL OBSTACLES TO THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF
A DECLARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
The regime of rights under the United Nations Universal
Declaration relies on a kind of moral positivism. Its guarantees serve
as a check on the terms of national legal systems after the manner of
moral norms acknowledged as binding by the judge or social critic,
but, at the same time, they appear to be posited as if virtually a form
of higher law. The effectiveness of the rights depends on a kind of
fiction that they possess self-evident truth and are of self-executing
force. Pope John Paul II perpetuates this fiction in asserting that these
formal concepts "are inscribed in the very nature of reality."
25 In fact,
a constructive exercise is required to translate the guarantees of the
Declaration into an epistemologically credible set of moral
propositions. Such a constructive account must demonstrate how the
content of the Declaration and related documents can be considered
to express the genuine demands of the good and the right and how,
more specifically, the Declaration's demands are to be realized in
concrete circumstances.
In the classic view of Aristotle, the political order acquires its
meaning by participation in intrinsic ends. It aims at the good.
26
Correspondingly, law secures society's compliance with standards of
conduct that advance the good.27 What one is due under the law, i.e.
24. "[Tlhe rights tradition into which the church has tapped is the biblically informed,
continental, dignitarian tradition which she herself had already done so much to shape. 'The
Catholic doctrine of human rights,' Avery Dulles points out, 'is not based on Lockean
empiricism or individualism. It has a more ancient and distinguished pedigree."' Glendon,
supra note 6, at 13.
25. "in expounding the philosophical foundation of human rights John Paul II insists that
they... are inscribed in the very nature of reality." Dulles, supra note 1, at 15.
26. Aristotle writes,
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a
view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think
good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community,
which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater
degree than any other, and at the highest good.
ARISTOTLE, POLMCS, Book I, ch. 1, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1994
(Jonathan Barnes ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1984).
27. "In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest
degree a good in the most authoritative of all-this is the political science of which the good is
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one's "right," follows indirectly from the community's commitment
to some demonstrable conception of authentic human fulfillment.
Aristotle held that the priority of claims under rule of the state could
be ranked only "if we take into account a good life."2 8 In this view,
the notion of a list of rights apart from a philosophically sound
account of what is genuinely worth attaining is absurd.29  Likewise,
the idea that one could give priority to the wishes or needs of discrete
actors or relationships within society as "rights," apart from a
comprehensive account of the good of the complete community
would be untenable.3 °
The more fully one can transcend a positivistic interpretation of a
rights declaration by constructing a philosophical justification for
considering it, in effect, a shorthand articulation of the requirements
of a full theory of the good like Aristotle's, the greater its value for
coordinating stable and lasting solutions to societal conflicts.
Certainly, the Catholic tradition has long assumed that such a
philosophical justification is possible.31 In its endorsements of the
justice, in other words, the common interest.... Hence it is evident that in seeking for justice
men seek for the mean, for the law is the mean." Id. Book III, ch. 12, at 2035; Book III, ch. 16, at
2043.
28. Id. Book HI, ch. 13.
29. See id.
30. "The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a
community by education ... " Id. Book II, ch. 5, at 2005.
31. John A. Coleman, S.J. describes this desideratum as a need to "generate... a theory of
basic rights." John A. Coleman, S.J., Catholic Human Rights Theory: Four Challenges to an
Intellectual Tradition, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 355 (1984). David Hollenbach says, "Philosophers and
political theorists have a major contribution to make to the development of this more integral
and coherent approach." HOLLENBACH, supra note 4, at 34. He asserts that there are three
questions which an adequate human rights theory must address: "What is the foundation of
human rights? What is the relation between different human rights? What is the relation
between human rights and the institutions of social, political and economic life?" Id. at 33.
Hollenbach observes that the Church's role is unique in pursuing human rights advocacy from a
perspective that itself requires theoretical grounding, that it is "among... nongovernmental
organizations ... notable for the degree to which it has developed an approach to human rights
which is both activist and theoretically rigorist." Id. at 34. Charles Taylor holds that,
philosophically speaking, some such justification is necessary for rights concepts to have
currency. He states,
To be accepted in any given society, these would in each case have to repose on some
widely acknowledged philosophical justification; and to be enforced in fact, they
would have to find expression in legal mechanisms. One way of putting our central
question might be this: what variations can we imagine in philosophical justifications
or in legal forms that would still be compatible with a meaningful universal consensus
on what really matters to us, the enforceable norms?
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post-World War II rights framework, the Church has, however,
evaded saying what that justification is, often treating rights language
as essentially self-evident.32 Meanwhile, rival viewpoints promote
alternate interpretations of the United Nations documents whose
utilitarian and individualistic tenets contradict the Church's implicit
position.33
In the view of classical political philosophy, the rights framework
of the United Nations Declaration will, nonetheless, remain of no
more than imperfect value, even when supported by an adequate
constructive effort linking it to a sufficient theory of the good. From
an Aristotelian perspective, the concept of rights remains inherently
dubious because it fosters a kind of cosmopolitanism. The touchstone
of the rights-bearing individual relativizes the authority of all cultural
institutions. The rights framework implicitly accords centrality to the
market, as the forum within which rights-bearing individuals
undertake exchanges according to individualized preferences. Thus,
from the viewpoint of Aristotle, rights have a doubly questionable
character. In contrast to a rights-theorist such as John Locke, Aristotle
considered the opportunity for abstract profit represented by buying
and selling to represent a decadent falling away from intrinsic
meaning.' Aristotle, no less than the Catholic Aquinas after him, was
wary of the intrinsic tendency of cosmopolitanism to break the link
between the polls and the appeal of universal values.
35 Thus, even as
Charles Taylor, A World Consensus on Human Rights, DISSENT, Summer 1996, at 15, reprinted
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 409, 415.
32. Mary Ann Glendon believes the shift away from natural law theory "was also part of
the church's shift from nature to history, as well as her increasing openness to learning from
other traditions." Glendon, supra note 6, at 12. David Hollenbach thinks, "Though major
advances have been made at the U.N. the synthesis remains more of a political compromise than
a genuine theoretical breakthrough. It is therefore an unstable synthesis." HOLLENBACH, supra
note 4, at 33.
33. According to Mary Ann Glendon, their "features include: rights envisioned without
corresponding individual or social responsibilities; one's favorite rights touted as absolute with
others ignored; the rights-bearer imagined as radically autonomous and self-sufficient; and the
willy-nilly proliferation of new rights." Glendon, supra note 11, at 35.
34. Catholic social thought gives this economic implication of rights thinking a nuanced
endorsement. George Weigel states that Catholic social teaching endorses "a tripartite system in
which democratic politics and a vibrant moral culture discipline and temper the free market...
is the system the pope urges the new democracies and the Third World to adopt." Weigel,
supra note 18, at 217.
35. ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, Book I, ch. 9, at 1995 ("For natural riches and the natural art
of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a
household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by
exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the
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the Catholic Church champions rights talk as a legitimate way of
promoting universal participation in what the Church holds to be
authentic human fulfillment, one observes empirically that the
ideology of rights serves to break up traditional cultures and to
extend the scope of Western-style economic markets.36
As well as a concept of the good, a sustainable philosophical
foundation for the rights manifesto would encompass an explanation
of the relationship of rights to "what is right," i.e. a theory of justice.
In the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, traditionally endorsed
by Catholicism,"' "rights," in fact, are no more than a description of
what justice requires in a given circumstance:
[T]he right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set
up by its relation to others.... [A] man's work is said to be just when
it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for
instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so
a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is
the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in
which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is
declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent.
For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and
limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth-getting. As
in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no
limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the
uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of
wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and the
acquisition of wealth.").
36. John Langan inadvertently touches upon a significant cause of the Church's
abandonment of a more precise philosophical account of its rights position. "The decisive
removal of equivocation on the issue of religious freedom by Vatican II was a major, though
belated, accomplishment which both preserved the credibility of the Catholic Church's teaching
on human rights and opened the way to fuller and richer relationships with other religious
traditions." Langan, supra note 5, at 34. But, as Langan also notes concerning the Church's
change in position on religious freedom, "Few major accomplishments, however, are without
problematic consequences." Id.
37. Pope Leo XIII specifically endorsed the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as the
perennial philosophy of the Catholic Church:
Let carefully selected teachers endeavor to implant the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in
the minds of the students, and set forth clearly his solidity and excellence over others.
Let the academies already founded or to be founded by you illustrate and defend this
doctrine, and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors.
Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris [Encyclical Letter on the Restoration of Christian Philosophj [
31] 21 (St. Paul ed. 1990). But apart from the neo-scholastic revival engendered by that Pope, the
reasoning of St. Thomas Aquinas dominates the Catholic moral tradition.
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above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the
same as right. Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.
38
While Aquinas leaves room for customary formulations of the
"right" in situations that recur, according to the converging pattern of
the ius gentium (law of nations), these formulations derive their
authority from universal acceptance among ongoing communities of
social practice.39 In each case, the common norm calls for a righting of
relations between or among persons, all pertinent circumstances
having first been taken into account. By contrast to rights, as they are
generally understood today, Aquinas's conception of "what is right"
is neither a pure abstraction nor even an abstract prerogative or
attribute of an identifiable individual or discrete group.'
John Finnis argues persuasively that, if used in a disciplined way,
rights talk can legitimately be employed to express the fullness of the
demands of justice. Rights may be asserted, no less than claims in
justice, with rationally defensible content.
4 1 Yet, the format of the
38. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I-II, Question 57, Article 1 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911).
39. Aquinas writes,
On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it, is
proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason
which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says: whatever natural reason decrees among
all men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations.
Id. Part 11-II, Question 57, Article 3 (citation omitted).
40. Id. Part I-II, Question 57, Article 1 ("[T]here pre-exists in the mind an expression of the
particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence...
called a law, which ... is not the same as right, but an expression of right."); see also id. Part I-II,
Question 95, Article 2 ("[T]he first rule of reason is the law of nature.... Consequently every
human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.... But
it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a
conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first
way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are
particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to
some particular shape.... Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law.
But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as
emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those
things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.").
41. As Finnis explains,
The modem language of rights provides, as I said, a supple and potentially precise
instrument for sorting out and expressing the demands of justice.... Let me conclude
this review of the shift of meaning in the term "right" [away from meaning "duty"]
and its linguistic predecessors by repeating that there is no cause to take sides as
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rights manifesto does not lend itself to Finnis's disciplined
interpretation. Questions of justice concern actions that are either
past or, if hypothetical, sufficiently concrete and immediate as to
count as if actual.42 Declarative rights have a different temporal
reference. They function as a call to create future possibilities of
participation in the good through reform. As such, declarative rights
can never have precisely the same determinate content as have claims
in justice-specifically, they can never give rise to fully justiciable
claims. They tend by their nature to blur the boundary between
politics and law and, within law, between the judicial and legislative
functions. Since a declaration of rights serves to mobilize political
objection to uses of power, one is never able wholely to distinguish it
from a statement of interests. Thus, the Pope warns against the
standing danger of the United Nations Declaration "decisively
subjugated by what is wrongly called political interest."43
The task of turning a declaration of rights to the critique of
particular social institutions raises a distinctive set of problems
regarding the meaning to be accorded established societal practices.
Thinkers such as Burke in England, von Savigny in Germany, and,
more recently, Alexander Bickel in the United States develop grounds
for considering these problems to be a basis for objecting to abstract
concepts such as rights. These theorists emphasize the perils of
cutting a society's institutions to the cloth of purely abstract ideals.
Aquinas restricts his cross-cultural generalizations about norms to
those he can validate by convergent praxis. These thinkers assert that
one can legitimately critique institutions only as an exercise in
political prudence grounded in cumulative experience.
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke rejects
the overturning of the old order in favor of such new abstract
imperatives as the Declaration of the Rihghts of Man, observing,
between the older and the newer usages, as ways of expressing the implications of
justice in a given context.
FINIs, supra note 4, at 210. Thus, "duty" does not necessarily have a logical priority to "right"
but, instead may have "a more strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights." Id. at 210.
For Finnis, the meaning of rights, no less than that of claims in justice, are specified in relation to
a concept of the common good. Id. at 210-18.
42. Finnis provides a frame of analysis for specifying the meaning of asserted rights "in
three-term right-duty relationships." Id. at 225.
43. Pope John Paul II, supra note 9, at 301.
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The science of government being therefore so practical in itself and
intended for such practical purposes-a matter which requires
experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in
his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be-it is
with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages
the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without
having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.
44
He emphasizes that the present generation lacks adequate scope of
perspective to comprehend either the full import of the experience of
the past, or of future consequences to justify global changes to
received institutions, by appeal to purely abstract norms. Burke
proposes a mode of respect for human dignity that is a sharp contrast
to the abstract rights of the revolutionaries in France. He suggests
that lawmakers and judges must cherish an "idea of inheritance"
according to which the "advantages" of due civil order "are... locked
fast" in the concrete practices helping to constitute "the great
mysterious incorporation of the human race" . . . "as in a sort of
family settlement, grasped as in a kind of mortmain forever."
4 He
allows for change, to advance "original justice,"
46 but only where such
change can be "carefully formed upon analogical precedent,
authority, and example."
47
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the founder of the historical school of
jurisprudence,4" joins Burke in repudiating the abstract codification
44. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 69-70 (Thomas H. D.
Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1790).
45. Id. at 38.
46. Id. at 109.
47. Id. at 36. Burke asserts that "the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human
intellect, which with its defects, redundancies, and errors" studies "the collected reason of ages,
combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns." Id. at
108. The Casey plurality discussed how stare decisis provides a reason why change in American
abortion policy is not reversible after twenty years of planning private economic lives:
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives....
[Wihile the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the
certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living
around that case be dismissed.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
48. "The starting point of the historical school is, of course, Savigny's small but celebrated
pamphlet 'Ueber den Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft'. It was
published in October, 1814, and directed against Thibaut, the head of the so-called philosophical
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associated with the French Revolution. The focus of his opposition is
the subsequent Napoleonic law reform. He concludes his Of the
Vocation of Our Age for Legislation andJurisprudence by stating,
In the opinions we form of our present condition, also, we coincide,
[with those who favor French abstract codification], for we both
regard it as defective. They, however, see the cause of the evil in the
sources of law, and believe that they could remedy it by a code-I
on the other hand, find it in ourselves, and believe, for this very
reason, that we are not qualified to frame a code.49
Von Savigny doubts the capacity of individual human reason
reliably to formulate abstract norms, in isolation from the historically
demonstrated good of a concrete community. In this view, the
neutrality of purely abstract norms is only apparent. Inherent bias
enters with the hidden interests of the party who formulates them or
applies them in concrete circumstances. The jurist is, for this reason,
not qualified to articulate and apply abstract norms, but only to study
and clarify the proper application of the best received legal forms, as
these are transmitted within a living legal culture. Norms, adequate
to advance the good of a particular culture, take shape according to
the distinctive orientation of the culture, through generations of
common practice. In Germany, von Savigny saw this organic
unfolding in the traditional influence of Roman law."° No less than
Burke's, von Savigny's reasoning suggests that skepticism is
appropriate regarding the wisdom of endorsing an abstract rights
manifesto, such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of
school." Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 LAW Q. REv. 326,
332 (1937) (footnote omitted).
49. FRIEDRICH CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 182-83 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1975) (1831).
50. Kantorowicz, supra note 48, at 332-33 ("Like language, manners, and constitution, law
has no separate existence, but is a simple function or facet of the whole life of the nation. In
early times the common conviction of the people is the origin of the law. But with the
development of civilization the making of law, like every other activity, becomes a distinct
function, and is now exercised by the legal profession. In every higher civilization the jurists,
therefore, represent the people in the creation of the law. Thus, law is always organically
connected with the development of social life. It arises from silent, anonymous forces, which are
not directed by arbitrary and conscious intention, but operate in the way of customary law....
The real remedy for the deficiencies of German law was to apply strictly historical methods, and
thus to purify the original Roman law from its defilement through modem ignorance and




Human Ri-ghts, as the legitimate basis of constitutional reform within
a particular nation.
In The Morality of Consent, Alexander M. Bickel takes up, in a
more contemporary setting, the themes of Burke and von Savigny.
Bickel concurs with the pre-modem Aristotle and Aquinas, in
asserting that "[iun order to survive, be coherent and stable, and
answer to men's wants, a civil society ha[s] to rest on a foundation of
moral values."'" However, he agrees with von Savigny and Burke,
that this foundation may not be imposed by "theoretical definition."52
He holds that is to be discovered "in balances between differences of
good, in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and
sometimes between evil and evil."53 Bickel quotes Burke, with
approval, to the effect that "Political reason is a computing principle:
adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not
metaphysically, or mathematically, true moral denominations."'' He,
therefore, concludes that "[t]he rights of man, this is to say, have no
independent, theoretical existence. They do not preexist and
condition civil society. They are in their totality the right to decent,
wise, just, responsive, stable government in the circumstances of a
given time and place."55
Bickel identifies his position and, implicitly, those of von Savigny
and Burke, as representative of the whig or conservative, as opposed
to liberal political tradition.56 This tradition is skeptical that abstract
norms, such as those in a rights manifesto, can offer a reliable basis for
the reform of societal institutions. Such skepticism need not go so far
as to necessitate the rejection of a document like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, but it does ensure that such a
document can serve as no more than a loose aspirational ideal,
understood as requiring the mediation by political prudence, to find
its concrete organic meaning within the inherited legal and moral
terms of the culture, and, depending as well on inherited institutional
channels of decision, for its application. There can be no doubt that
Bickel would be skeptical regarding Catholic social teaching's
wholesale enthusiasm for the United Nations human rights regime,
51. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 23 (1975).
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Edmund Burke).
54. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Edmund Burke).
55. Id. at 20.
56. See id. at 12.
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conceived as a concrete step towards the world-wide unification of
law.
Equally disinclined to consider abstract rights concepts adequate,
a variation on the conservatism of Bickel, Burke, and von Savigny can
be seen in the quasi-millenarian or utopian views of liberation
theology. Liberation theologians, and those who think like them,
merely insist that content can be given rights not by reference to the
past, but only in reliance on a concretely envisioned future that finds
its orientation in an omega point. In commenting on the Jose Miguez
Bonino's Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situaton, James W.
Skillen and Rockne M. McCarthy note that "liberation theology is not
so much anti-historical as it is futuristic.... Miguez Bonino and other
liberation theologians take history as seriously as did Burke .... Yet
they view history more in the light of its future positive goal and
destiny than in the light of its past traditions."57
III. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF A
DECLARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
In addition to the difficulties caused by the gaps in a viable theory
of human rights, obstacles of a practical kind may arise to the reliable
interpretation of a declarative human rights framework. These
practical challenges underscore the need for a more adequate
theoretical foundation for declarative rights. They may arise within
the dynamic of the functioning human rights regime. Instances of
such internal challenges include the commandeering of the rights
frameworks by the impulses of individualism, utilitarian social
engineering, interest politics, and cultural chauvinism. They may also
arise through stresses external to the framework, which interfere with
its reception. Examples include the disaffection and anxiety of
rootless cosmopolitanism; the diversion of the human religious and
moral instincts by fundamentalism; and traditional cultures' retreat
from globalization into various forms of parochialism.
A. Subversion from Within
The Catholic Church endorses the international human rights
framework, because doing so promises to contribute to an integral
57. Jos6 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, reprinted in
POLMCAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 115, 115-16 Uames W. Skillen &
Rockne M. McCarthy eds., 1991).
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realization by the human community of its objective fulfillment. But
John A. Coleman, S.J., has identified the practical danger that the
rights framework will be read to favor liberal individualism, with the
consequence that it is no longer suited to advance Christian notions of
fulfillment.5 8 An inherent ambiguity in the formal and positive
character of a rights declaration means that theoretical interpretations
other than the Church's will receive play within society. No amount
of theoretical foundation for the Church's interpretation of rights will
have an effect if popular sentiment accords them a different meaning.
If, differently than the Church, the general community interprets the
grammar of rights as one of radical individualism, the Church must
be aware that such grammar will not, in fact, serve to coordinate
societal conduct in a manner that fosters the goal of human dignity
that the Church cherishes. 9
58. Coleman states that "a theoretical foundation of rights which appeals too simply to the
dignity of the human person ... could legitimate a liberal political philosophy, at odds with the
Catholic social theory. Such a theoretical basis might promote individualism and undermine
social solidarity." Coleman, supra note 31, at 353 (quoting Gregory Baum, The Catholic
Foundation of Human Rights, in 18 THE ECUMENIST 8 (1979)). Coleman further quotes Baum
approvingly:
[Oln the contrary,... the theoretical basis for civil liberties and all human rights
is the common good of society, i.e. the values, institutions, laws and structures
that mediate relations between persons and groups in accordance with their
dignity.... [R]ights... are not granted simply because the subjective demands
of persons must not be violated.
They are granted, rather, because they are the necessary condition for a public good
which serves as a matrix for human survival, action, and flourishing.
Id. at 355 (quoting Baum, supra, at 10). James W. Skillen and Rockne M. McCarthy observe that
this individualist interpretation deserves to be discredited:
The Enlightenment myth of the progress of freedom, according to Nisbet, holds that
as individuals become liberated from the past constraints of aristocratic and
ecclesiastical bondage, they will become ever more independent, happy, and self-
determining. This faith leads its adherents to reject much of what is good about
traditional associations and community life. A chief consequence is that these
supposedly liberated individuals fall prey to bureaucratic and even totalitarian states
which make them less free in many cases than their ancestors had been.
James W. Skillen & Rockne M. McCarthy, Introducton to POLMCAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL
STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 57, at 1, 6.
59. Mary Ann Glendon writes,
For the new rhetoric of rights is less about human dignity and freedom than about
insistent, unending desires. Its legitimation of individual and group egoism is in flat
opposition to the great purposes set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution: "to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
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When diverse philosophies valuing relational measures of
fulfillment compete to dictate the societal interpretation of rights,
moreover, a philosophy other than the variants of the
Aristotelian/Thomist philosophy traditionally associated with the
Church may prevail. One thinks specifically of philosophies of social
engineering. What the right requires in concrete circumstances
readily becomes whatever a utilitarian calculus demands. Such
philosophies are chameleon-like in their ability to adopt without
change the external coloration of the language of rights while altering
their actual content. Arguably, the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution has evolved away from
older relational conceptions to advance more utilitarian objectives.
The United States Supreme Court now advances abortion as an
individual right, but its decisions appear driven by essentially
utilitarian regard for integrating women as participants into the
economic life of the nation on an equal footing with men, without
requiring a distribution of the costs of their child-bearing to the wider
community.' The Catholic belief that the framework of human rights
will necessarily function to advance the Christian vision of integral
human fulfillment is, therefore, not, without more, justified.
The formal quality of rights talk, with its operative value for
challenging the allocation of power, introduces some distortions into
the quest for a theoretically coherent concept of rights. These
distortions arise from the impact of the politics of interest which
creeps into the application of the rights framework in the
international arena. Some trade-offs are theoretically justified. The
quest for consensus among people holding diverse views is an
appropriate expression of the value of human solidarity. But, pure
interest politics also makes use of the rights framework.61 The
Church, no less than the Bush Administration, is vulnerable to being
caught up in such maneuvers. The Church, too, can be found either
advancing a human-rights critique of a regime, or remaining silent,
according to its perceived balance of interests.62 For example,
GLENDON, supra note 21, at 171-72.
60. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
61. David Hollenbach distinguishes among considerations of theoretically based trade-offs,
consensus-building based on solidarity, and the politics of interest. See HOLLENBACH, supra
note 4, at 141-209.
62. "Neither governments nor international agencies ... are especially effective advocates
of human rights. Either their own self-interest, or pressing diplomatic reasons, severely limits
governmental moral leverage on human rights questions." Coleman, supra note 31, at 344.
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observers cite Apostolic Nuncio Pio Laghi's games of tennis with the
generals of the Pinochet regime.63 The danger exists of rights talk
acting as a cover for corruption among those who have or want
power, whether in the Church or the political regime. Moreover, the
mere perception that this exists undermines the value of the
declarative rights framework for mediating genuine political
discourse.
A final obstacle to of the human rights framework actually serving
its intended telos arises through the phenonmenon of cultural
imperialism.6' A dominant culture employs rights concepts
selectively, to undermine the stability of local cultural order for the
sake of its hegemony. Some in Islam see a current example in the
Bush Administration's greater demand for human-rights change in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran than in Saudi Arabia.65 The use of the
rights concept may be consciously or unconsciously adopted by the
aggressor for the sake of symbolizing cultural dominance. The use of
Christianity to pacify indigenous Americans in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries provides a certain parallel.66 Whatever
63. Pio Laghi played tennis with a high ranking Pinochet officer, Admiral Emilio Eduardo
Massera, "almost every day" while Pinochet was in power. John L. Allen Jr., These Paths Lead
to Rome, NAT'L CATH. REP., June 2, 2000, at 13.
64. The charge can be brought by those objecting, in general, to the subordination of
regional cultures: "[PIroponents of the conspiracy theory charge that human rights advocacy
amounts to moral imperialism. In short, 'the effect, if not the design, of such an exclusive
political preoccupation [is] to leave the door open to the most ruthless and predatory economic
forces in international society."' Tes6n, supra note 18, at 391 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added). The charge can also be brought by the Church objecting to the attack by individualism
on communitarian morals: "[11n June [of 1994], 114 of the world's 139 cardinals.., backed John
Cardinal O'Connor of New York in a demand that the Cairo conference should not produce
'cultural mperial'sm' by which 'abortion on demand, sexual promiscuity and distorted notions
of the family are proclaimed as human rights."' Alan Cowell, Vatican Attacks Population Stand
Supported by U.S, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1994, at Al (emphasis added).
65. Cf JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 2-3
(2004) ("[Tlhat the United States has a distinctive rights culture and often uses distinctive legal
terminology is not troubling. Indeed, the distinctiveness of the United States may benefit
human rights claimants. However, the use of a double standard may be devastating both for
U.S. human rights foreign policy and for the future of human rights.") (footnote omitted).
66. See GEORGE E. TINKER, MISSIONARY CONQUEST: THE GOSPEL AND NATIVE AMERICAN
CULTURAL GENOCIDE 6 (1993) ("The 'Civilization' Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1819 was
clearly an attempt to co-opt the churches and their missionaries to serve the government's
political ends with respect to Indian peoples. And the missionaries were only too glad to be co-
opted for the sake of federal land grants and funding for mission schools. The so-called Grant
Peace Policy of the 1870s delegated to the denominations the responsibility for filling the
positions of Indian agent, parceling out particular nations or reservations to various
denominations. The missionaries of all the churches came to Indian nations with the firm
support of the political authorities.") (footnotes omitted).
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morally legitimate interpretations exist for the ideology that the
dominant culture officially advances, a dynamic of cultural
chauvinism can cripple the capacity of the local culture authentically
to assimilate a new idea, either because of passivity or resentment.
All of the practical challenges mentioned here were apparently in
the ascendant at the United Nations 1994 Conference on Population
and Development in Cairo and its Fourth World Conference on
Women held in 1995 in Beijing. Conference participants do not
appear to have contested the stated terms of the United Nations
manifesto of human rights on its face. But, under the surface of
agreement on formal language, interest politics raged, radical
individualism was advanced, utilitarian social engineering agendas
moved forward, and cultural chauvinism appeared to flex its
muscle.67 The Church, for its part, wasted no time seeking consensus
in theory, but acted to form alliances with fundamentalist Islamists
for the sake of securing what it considered the interests of authentic
moral practice.68
B. Subversion from Without
Factors of an external kind may also interfere with the
effectiveness of the human rights framework. Cultural instability
arising with globalization may join with the apparently superficial
cultural cosmopolitanism of human rights formulations to create
profound anxiety or insecurity.6 9 Such insecurity may lead groups to
opt for the sense of security offered by power-based regimes. In the
more distant past, one observes the Napoleonic era following the
French Revolutionary period, and that of Hitler following the Weimar
67. See Glendon, supra note 11, at 30-36.
68. "At the Cairo Conference, . . . the Vatican and allies such as... Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
and Sudan, were able to effectively force 'the lowest common denominator on these issues, in
the face of the fact that well over 170 delegations might have agreed with more progressive
recommendations."' Rishona Fleishman, Comment, The Battle Against Reproduct've Rights:
The Impact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas,
14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 277, 284-85 (2000) (footnotes omitted). "In Beijing, ... [jiust as in Cairo,
the Vatican found itself allied with conservative Muslim countries on various issues.... During
both conferences there seemed to be more similarities between the delegates from
fundamentalist Islamic nations and the Holy See than delegates from other sovereigns." Id. at
287-88 (footnotes omitted).
69. "We may note... that an ethnic group can be culture-rather than interest-based and
yet be reactive. For a social categorisation [sic] that fails to acknowledge cultural distinctiveness
may itself trigger group identification that focuses on precisely this distinctiveness." PAUL
GILBERT, PEOPLES, CULTURES AND NATIONS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 (2000).
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Republic. At present, commentators note, with concern, signs of an
apparent incipient parallel in countries like Russia, which may be
experiencing a freeze after an initial period of greater openness
following the fall of the Soviet Empire.'0 One may recognize aspects
of this same pattern in the widespread suspicion that exists towards
the policies of the United Nations in the western United States, in an
extreme form, within the militia movement.7 '
70. Darrin M. McMahon explains the reaction to the Enlightenment impulse of the French
Revolution as follows:
By attacking hierarchy and touting equality, the declaration dangerously subverted
the natural order of France. It severed essential ties that bound men and women
together, removed necessary social restraints, and turned subjects toward the whims
and passions of individual desire-all in the name of a groundless set of abstract
principles.
DARRIN M. MCMAHON, ENEMIES OF THE ENLIGHTEMENT 70 (2001). "With such an enemy, there
could be no compromise.... To read the Revolution as the realization for philosophie was to
oppose it." Id. at 73. Detlev Peukert describes,
Nowhere else in Europe had both traditional values and new political and social
reforming ideas been so called into question as they had been in post-war Germany;
and nowhere else had public life become so politicized and polarized. The one
phenomenon reduced the chances of an accommodation between liberals and
conservatives and threatened the very survival of the fundamental compromises of
1918. The other deprived the old 6lites of the mass support they needed in their
search for a return to authoritarianism, while at the same time ruling out the
possibility of any authoritarian solution that did not rest on such support. Finding
themselves in an impasse of their own making, the old 6lites plumped for an alliance
with Hitler.
DETLEV J. K. PEUKERT, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: THE CRISIS OF CLASSICAL MODERNITY 266-67
(Richard Deveson trans., 1992). In the contemporary instance of Russia, Richard Pipes, in a
parallel vein, notes,
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, expectations were high that Russia, rid of
communism, would take a firm pro-Western course: democratizing its political
system, granting its citizens unassailable civil rights, and rejoining the international
community. Such were the promises made by President Boris Yeltsin when he took
charge. But after more than a decade, these expectations have not been realized.
Since ex-KGB colonel Vladimir Putin took over as president in 2000, Russia's
democratic institutions have been muzzled, its civil rights restricted, and its
cooperation with the international community far from assured.
Richard Pipes, Flight from Freedom: What Russians Think and Want, 3 FOREIGN AFF., May-June
2004, at 9, 9 (2004).
71. As one of the three unifying themes of the Contemporary American militia movement,
D. J. Mulloy cites "a fear that the United States itself is under threat from an international
conspiracy attempting to institute a 'New World Order' or 'one world government' on the
country under .the auspices of the United Nations." D. J. MULLOY, AMERICAN EXTREMISM:
HISTORY, POLITICS AND THE MILITIA MOVEMENT 1 (2004).
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The Catholic Church has a religious motivation for supporting the
declarative human-rights framework, but the at times rationalistic
appearance of that framework, together with its tendency to relativize
concrete traditions of belief, may lead other religions to withhold their
support from it, or even to assume the overtly antagonistic
counterpoint of religious fundamentalism.72 Thus, the mode of
discourse offered under the United Nations human rights framework
may actually be another factor alongside the economic and cultural
policies of so-called first world countries helping to explain the
resurgence of religious fundamentalism in some parts of the world.
IV. THE RESPONSE OF THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OBSTACLES TO THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
In addition to endorsing the declarative rights framework of the
United Nations, and offering an exposition of its content, Catholic
social teaching offers at least some warrants for accepting it, and some
suggestions for making it more effective. But, how successful is
Catholic social teaching in addressing the lacunae noted above in the
theoretical foundations of the rights regime as sketched above? When
one searches the documents of Catholic social teaching for an answer,
one discovers little of substance, in fact, beyond the Church's
magisterial authority as a basis for assenting to the United Nations
declarative framework. While Catholic documents promulgated since
World War II include some of the terminology of natural law, as in
Pacem in Terris,73 that philosophical support generally falls away in
more recent documents.74 The one exception to this paucity of
72. "Still, in many countries, Islamist movements have attacked those seeking change as
Western stooges and enemies of Islam, and they have seized on resistance to women's rights as
an issue in their power struggle with moderate Muslim rulers." Susan Sachs, Force of Islam: A
Woman's Place, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at B1, 2001 WLNR 3400421.
73. David Hollenbach observes that "Pacem in Terris develops... [its] themes by a careful
discussion of the correspondence between rights and duties." HOLLENBACH, supra note 4, at 65.
He states that "[ilts approach provides theological justiciation for appeals to reason and natural
law as the bases of a theory of human rights." Id. at 109.
74. Hollenbach sees that the approach in Pacem in Terris gives way to the "other pole,
represented by Gaudium et Spes, plac[ing] greater emphasis on the contribution which
Christian faith can make to the theory of rights in a pluralistic world." Id. Hollenbach's inquiry
into "A Christian Theory of Rights" essentially uncovers reliance on the concept of imago Dei,
and the theological rather than philosophical nature of the Church's position. Id. at 108-09.
Athough Hollenbach gives a clear and concise overview of rights-related themes in ecclesial
documents through the end of the term of Pope Paul VI, he would seem to contradict himself in
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philosophical development is the documents' reliance on the
language of Christian personalism.75 The concept of personalism
contributes something to the philosophical depth of contemporary
human rights discourse, but Church documents espouse the
philosophy cursorily, without supplying arguments in its support, or
explaining why personalism is preferable to other philosophical
options.
The outstanding contribution of contemporary Catholic teaching
to the discourse of human rights remains theological rather than
philosophical. Throughout their pages, these Catholic documents
emphasize the hierarchical and integral character of the human goods
that rights guarantees protect.76 They are decisive in identifying the
human person's status, imago Dei as the ground of all human rights
and God, as representing the human person's summum bonum,
within the pattern of goods which respect for rights fosters.7 In
addition to endorsing human rights, as a political matter, the Church
terming the content of the Catholic documents "theoretical" while citing a "theoretical vacuum"
and a continuing unmet need for the creation of theory. Id, at 33. Hollenbach is correct when he
implies that the content of these documents is "doctrinal" not theoretical.
75. Laborem Exercens provides an example of the personalism of Catholic social teaching,
stating: "The Church's teaching has always expressed the strong and deep conviction that man's
work concerns not only the economy but also, and especially, personal values." Pope John Paul
H1, Laborem Exercens [Encyclical Letter on Human Work] 15 (St. Paul ed. 1981).
76. Pacem in Terris states,
Now an order of this kind, whose principles are universal, absolute and
unchangeable, has its ultimate source in the one true God, Who is personal and
transcends human nature. Inasmuch as God is the first Truth and the highest Good,
He alone is that deepest source from which human society can draw its vitality, if that
society is to be well ordered, beneficial, and in keeping with human dignity.
Pacem in Terris, supra note 7, T 38 (footnote omitted).
77. Pope John Paul II writes,
If there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which man achieves his full identity,
then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just relations between people....
Thus, the root of modem totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the
transcendent dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible
God, is therefore by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate.
Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundredth Anniversary of
Rerum Novarum] 44 (St. Paul ed. 1991). A major point of similarity among Protestant and
Catholic theorists is that "most participants in the ecumenical consensus appeal to the imago Dei
in support of their human rights concern and root particular human rights in a concept of
human dignity or worth." Joseph L. Allen, Catholic and Protestant Theories of Human Rights,
14 RELIGIOUS STUD. REV. 347, 352 (1988). John Langan says that this emphasis in the Catholic
documents "creates new possibilities for dialogue with other religious traditions, especially
Protestantism." Langan, supra note 5, at 36.
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offers its own religious worship and practice to validate the rights
framework. By presenting declarative human rights as grounded in
reason and addressed to all people of good will, the Church may, at
times, distract attention from the constant basis of its position on
rights, which is actually theological. The Church can also divert
attention from this theological grounding when it-however
legitimately--chooses to emphasize the role of pragmatic consensus
in reaching cross-cultural understanding and agreement on the
meaning of rights.
V. A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR ENSURING THAT THE HUMAN
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADVANCES THE
TELOSOF HUMAN DIGNITY
The brief review here of the challenges that exist to realizing a
telos of human dignity through the declarative human rights
framework of the United Nations suggests a program of response.
This program would apply to the interpretation and application of
human rights in the realm of law and politics, but also to the Catholic
Church's formulation of its own options as an international human
rights advocate.
The popes have emphasized that the United Nations Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights represents a unique turning point in the
history of the supranational organization of human societies. Pope
John XXIII, for instance, termed it "an important step on the path
towards the juridical-political organization of all the peoples of the
world."'8 Pope John Paul II called it a "milestone on the long and
difficult path of the human race."79 An elaboration of the further
implications of this insight into the historic character of the Universal
Declaration is decisive for articulating a program better to advance
adequate interpretations of the declarative rights framework of the
United Nations.
Unlike the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French
Revolution that worried Burke and von Savigny, the United Nations
Declaration does not attempt to replace any intact, yet corrupt,
historic tradition with a new order. Rather, in its distinctive historical
moment, it seeks to be a substitute for the disorder of total war among
nation-states, as experienced in the World Wars of the twentieth
78. Pacem in Terris, supra note 7,91144.
79. Pope John Paul II, supra note 9, at 300.
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century. Thus, the rights framework offered by the United Nations
can properly be understood as an initial matrix or latticework upon
which a comprehensive world legal order can be expected eventually
to grow into place. The priority the rights framework gives
individual claims to relief from the oppressive use of power is,
moreover, not arbitrary, but rather can be considered a proportionate
response to the specific excesses of twentieth-century totalitarianism.
The manifesto character of these rights can be understood as designed
to elicit consensus in the midst of interest-politics, only as a short-
term matter, with the longer-term aspiration being maturation of the
"thin" declarative rights framework into a set of "thick," fully
justiciable, norms within a juridico-political order in the strict sense.
In time, a new order of established practice might come to embody
the considered experience of the community that would satisfy the
conservativism of a Burke. A history of past cases, successfully
adjudicated, would allow concepts of right more adequately to be
integrated into a settled praxis, sustained by, and sustaining, in turn,
a comprehensive and balanced understanding of the meaning of
justice in concrete circumstances.
The better defense of the United Nations human rights norms
would, therefore, be to tie their concrete assertion, wherever possible,
to concrete evidence of the evolving maturation of the world
community to the point of readiness for genuine elements suggesting
a juridico-political confederation of nations, along the lines described,
in keeping with at least one theoretical schema, aspirationally by
Immanuel Kant.8' In particular, it would be advisable to tie them to
the conditions of socio-economic interdependency which John Finnis
identifies as the source of the incipient authority of a supranational
legal order."' International agreement on the inalienability of intrinsic
and universal human values with corresponding restrictions on the
scope of international markets can provide an offset to the
80. "The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the
world is felt everywhere." IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace A Philosopucal Sketch, in
POLMCAL WRITINGS 107-08 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2nd ed. 1991).
81. "If it now appears that the good of individuals can only be fully secured and realized in
the context of international community, we must conclude that the claim of the national state to
be a complete community is unwarranted and the postulate of the national legal order, that it is
supreme and comprehensive and an exclusive source of legal obligation, is increasingly what
lawyers would call a 'legal fiction."' FINNIS, supra note 4, at 150. Finnis finds therein
consequences for the authority of legal systems and the content of obligations in justice. See id.
at 156, 260.
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cosmopolitan tendency of rights talk.82 The growth of international
agreements to combat crime crossing national borders, such as human
trafficking, serves to provide a relation between rights and general
norms of justice. 3 Principles of federalism and subsidiarity can
referee the respective balance of regional cultures entrusted with the
legacy of history and international coordination aspiring to the fresh
realization of ideals.' Even the latter coordination already has a
82. In each social teaching, the Catholic Church declares,
Government leaders, your task is to draw your communities into closer ties of
solidarity with all men, and to convince them that they must accept the necessary
taxes on their luxuries and their wasteful expenditures in order to promote the
development of nations and the preservation of peace. Delegates to international
organizations, it is largely your task to see to it that senseless arms races and
dangerous power plays give way to mutual collaboration between nations, a
collaboration that is friendly, peace-oriented, and divested of self-interest, a
collaboration that contributes greatly to the common development of mankind and
allows the individual to find fulfillment.
Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio [Encyclical Letter on the Development of Peoples] T 84
(1967), reprinted in CLAUDIA CARLEN, I.H.M., THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981, at 183, 198
(1981). The Catholic Church teaches further:
Development which is not only economic must be measured and oriented according
to the reality and vocation of man seen in his totality, namely, according to his interior
dimension. There is no doubt that he needs created goods and the products of
industry, which is constantly being enriched by scientific and technological
progress.... [But on] the basis of this teaching, development cannot consist only in
the use, dominion over and indiscrimninate possession of created things and the
products of human industry, but rather in subordinating the possession, dominion
and use to man's divine likeness and to his vocation to immortality.
Solicitudo ReiSocialis, supra note 8, 29.
83. See, e.g., United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Culdren, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000; Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7110 (2004).
84. On subsidiarity, Pacem in Terris states,
Moreover, just as it is necessary in each state that relations which the public
authority has with its citizens, families and .intermediate associations be controlled
and regulated by the principle of subsidiarity, it is equally necessary that the
relationships which exist between the world-wide public authority and the public
authorities of individual nations be governed by the same principle....
The world-wide public authority is not intended to limit the sphere of action of
the public authority of the individual state, much less to take its place. On the
contrary, its purpose is to create, on a world basis, an environment in which the public
authorities of each state, its citizens and intermediate associations, can carry out their
tasks, fulfill their duties and exercise their rights with greater security.
Pacem in Terris, supra note 7, 'U 140-41 (footnote omitted).
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history in international customary law offering material for
rumination in the style of Burke, von Savigny, or Bickel, that might be
retrieved and promulgated.8"
This program has implications for the Church of a less direct, but
equally important, kind. The program I propose suggests that the
Church would be advised to distinguish more clearly its unique
ecclesial perspective from the concrete diplomatic role of Vatican City
as a "state." If my view that the purely declarative phase of
international human rights observance should be considered
transitory is correct, the present interim should, nonetheless, be
considered fraught with peril for the authentic orientation of the
international community to the telos of human dignity. I have
described here those dangers to the integrity of human rights, both
from within and without, as a means of promoting the formation of a
global legal order. During this transition, the Church is not likely to
be found to have definitive philosophical answers to fill the gaps
noted in rights discourse by reference to the philosophies of Aristotle
or even Aquinas, let alone to possess the political prudence and
reserve called for by von Savigny, Burke, or Bickel. The Church does,
however, in distinctive measure, offer a credible, enduring witness to
the theological belief in the dignity of the person in the imago Dei and
to religious faith in humankind's summum bonum.
8 Let the Church
85. James Scott, for example, describes how international law arose out of the experience of
the discovery of the New World. He calls attention to the Spanish school of international law
founded in the sixteenth century by Francisco de Vitoria who was able to "analyse the
conditions of his day, feeling the necessity for a community larger than Christendom, and
foreseeing the international community of the future, even though its actual conditions must
have been unknown to him-more unknown by far than they are to us" and to apply the
concepts of "righteousness, justice, and the moral standard" in interpreting the meaning of
international practice for the "vast majority," among nations, "the small powers." JAMES BROWN
SCOTT, Preface to THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS
LAW OF NATIONS 9a (1934).
86. This theological basis helps sustain an underlying attitude conducive to formality
concepts:
I am convinced that the deepest roots of what we now call human rights lie
somewhere beyond us, and above us; somewhere deeper than the world of human
covenants-in a realm that I would, for simplicity's sake, describe as metaphysical.
Although they may fail to realize this, human beings-the only creatures who are
fully aware of their own being and of their mortality, and who perceive their
surroundings as a world and have an inner relationship with that world-derive their
dignity, as well as their responsibility, from the world as a whole: that is, from that in
which they see the world's central theme, its backbone, its order, its direction, its
essence, its soul-call it what you will. Christians put this quite simply: man is here in
the image of God.
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then proclaim the certainty it possesses on these points, while it
awaits the clarification of open philosophical questions by others. It
may not be realistic to think that Vatican diplomats can refrain from
diplomacy on behalf of Vatican and Church interests, but it does seem
fair to suggest that the Church would be best served by clearly and
unambiguously subordinating its diplomacy to its proclamation, in
and out of season, of the essential theological foundations of its
commitment to human rights.8 7 The Church's faith has unique value
as a bridge between the present, with its abstract blueprint of the
Universal Declaration of Human lights, and a future in which those
rights will have given rise to the concrete realization of a living world
legal order.
VAclav Havel, A Spiritual Covenant for Mankind, 6a REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 147, 148 (1998).
87. Rather than disqualifying the Catholic voice on human rights, its simple theological
root may enable it to collaborate on a more truly global level:
Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and communities. Religions
invariably provide universal sources and 'scales of values' by which many persons
and communities govern themselves.... Their faith and works must be adduced to
give meaning and measure to the abstract claims of human rights norms, to give spirit
and sanctity to the legal ideas and institutions of a human rights regime.
Witte, supra note 6, at 2-3.
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